Ukraine Trade Agreements

20) A 2018 European Commission report examining the implementation of EU free trade agreements contained information on the EU-Ukraine CCFTA. He pointed out that total trade in goods between the EU and Ukraine increased by 24% between 2016 and 2017, although it was not clear to what extent the CCFTA would have been produced in relation to trade, regardless of the non-presence of the CCFTA. Ukraine`s trade with the world increased sharply in 2016. However, in 2016, Ukraine`s trade with the EU grew faster than all of its trade. 15) Based on HMRC data only for trade in goods, Table 2 shows that in 2019, the main goods exported to Ukraine were vehicles other than rolling stock or tram equipment (HS87, USD 78 million) and aircraft, spacecraft and their parts (HS88, USD 77 million), or, together, less than one third of the total value of goods exported to Ukraine. The main products imported from the United Kingdom from Ukraine were iron and steel ($177 million) and cereals (US$10 million, US$173 million), which together accounts for more than half of imports from Ukraine. 70) The quotas indicated in the agreement between the United Kingdom and Ukraine were calculated on the basis of a mixture of tariff data and trade flows. 71) In order to address future market access opportunities for UK and Ukrainian companies, it was also agreed that these quotas should be subject to a minimum level of access, on the basis of a proxy measure relevant to trade with the United Kingdom. This will allow British and Ukrainian companies to apply a fair and evidence-based methodology. Before the treaty was signed, about one third of Ukraine`s foreign trade was with the European Union (EU); another third was with Russia. [6] 112) The United Kingdom has also extended the scope of its sectoral reserves to judicial officers to better reflect our national practice. This change is expected to have only a limited impact on trade flows. 24) The extent of the effects of the non-commissioning of the agreement between the United Kingdom and Ukraine would depend on the impact of trade flows on the increased costs of losing the provisions of the agreement.

18) In this context, preliminary data from the ONS show that approximately 340,500 registered (non-financial) companies in the United Kingdom traded in goods or services or another country in 2018 or another country in 2018. This represents almost 15% of all registered VAT/PAYE companies. In the UK, there were about 211,100 registered non-financial companies in the UK that trade with another country and 188,400 (non-financial) companies that marketed services in 2018. Some of these companies sold both goods and services. There will be other companies operating at the international level, which will not be identified in these surveys, since they are not registered for VAT. None of these sources covers companies operating below the VAT registration threshold. 27) Assumptions must be made to assess the potential impact of the loss of tariff preferences. All current trade between the United Kingdom and Ukraine has been at the negotiated preferential tariff rate and current trading models have remained unchanged in the future.

Excluding the effects of unilateral preferences other than uk GSP tariffs, the return to Ukraine`s current MFN tariffs and UK GSP tariffs would result in an annual increase in total tariffs of approximately $21 million. These are mainly tariffs on British exports ($17 million). Import duties are estimated to increase by $4 million. This figure is relatively small compared to the total value of trade with Ukraine, which was $1.5 billion in 2019.

Author: daniele130