At a meeting in a railway car in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne on 19 April 1917, a provisional agreement was reached between British and French Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Alexandre Ribot, as well as Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Paolo Boselli and Sidney Sonnino, to settle the Italian interest in the Ottoman Empire, in particular Article 9 of the Treaty of London.  The agreement was necessary by the Allies to secure the position of the Italian armed forces in the Middle East. Second, at the end of the war, the British, not the French, occupied the Asian Arab territory from within, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. As they played a stronger hand than the French, they took for themselves to divide this territory into zones under the authority of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. And the boundaries of the various administrative areas conflicted with those set by the Sykes-Picot agreement. Prior to the centenary of Sykes-Picot in 2016, the media and scientists generated strong interest in the long-term effects of the agreement. The agreement is often cited as “artificial” borders in the Middle East, “without regard to ethnic or sectarian characteristics, which has led to endless conflicts.”  The question of the extent to which Sykes-Picot has really marked the borders of the modern Middle East is controversial.   Hussein`s letter of February 18, 1916, McMahon appealed for 50,000 pounds of gold, more weapons, ammunition and food, saying Feisal was waiting for “no less than 100,000 people” to arrive for the planned revolt and McMahon`s response of 10 March 1916 confirming British approval of the applications and concluding the ten letters from correspondents. In April and May, Sykes discussed the benefits of a meeting in which Picot and the Arabs participated to network each other`s wishes. At the same time, logistics have been dealt with in the context of the promised revolt, and there has been growing impatience with what Hussein should do. Finally, at the end of April, McMahon was informed of the terms of Sykes-Picot and Grey and agreed that they would not be disclosed to the Arabs.  :57-60 A precise confrontation with the history of the role of European powers in the Middle East during the First World War makes it difficult to explain the Sykes-Picot analogy. As described in walid Jumblatt`s book to Hasan Nasrallah in May 1916, Sir Mark Sykes actually entered into a secret agreement with François Georges-Picot, which allows the French and British to divide the Middle East into separate zones of influence after a successful war.
This was the pinnacle of Anglo-French imperial ambition and their optimism about the end of the war. But by then, the trust behind the agreement had been called into question, with the head of British military intelligence comparing it to two “hunters who shared the bear`s skin before killing him.” On 18 September Faisal met in London and the next day and 23 had long meetings with Lloyd George, who explained the memory aid and the British position. Lloyd George stated that he was “in the position of a man who had inherited two groups of commitments, those of King Hussein and those of the French,” Faisal noted that the agreement “seemed to be based on the 1916 agreement between the British and the French.”